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Abstract
This paper studies the implications of consumer reference dependence in market
competition. If consumers take some product (e.g., the first product they have con-
sidered) as the reference point in evaluating others and exhibit loss aversion, then
the more “prominent” firm whose product is taken as the reference point by more
consumers will randomize its price over a high and a low one. All else equal, this
firm will on average earn a larger market share and a higher profit than its rival. The
welfare impact is that consumer reference dependence could harm firms and benefit
consumers by intensifying price competition. Consumer reference dependence will also
shape firms’ advertising strategies and quality choices. If advertising increases product
prominence, ex ante identical firms may diﬀerentiate their advertising intensities. If
firms vary in their prominence, the less prominent firm might supply a lower-quality
product even if improving quality is costless.
Keywords: advertising, competition, loss aversion, product quality, reference depen-
dence
JEL classification: D11, D43, L13, M37
1 Introduction
Economists have recently shown great interest in studying the market implications of hu-
man behavioral biases (see, for example, Ellison (2006)). A branch of this literature investi-
gates how consumers’ reference-dependent preferences (Kahneman and Tversky (1979,91))
influence the firm’s behavior in the market. A main finding is that consumer loss aversion
can cause price stickiness (Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2007), for instance). Complementary to
this view, this paper will present a model to argue that consumer loss aversion can also
give rise to price variation in a competitive market and help explain sales in the market.
Our model is motivated by the fact that people often encounter and consider options
sequentially, and lots of evidence has shown that the option which is considered (or tried)
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first could be favored disproportionately even if there is little cost involved in moving to
options considered later.1 One explanation, based on reference dependence, is that people
tend to regard the first option as the reference point when they come to value later ones,
and they display loss aversion in the sense later options’ relative disadvantages are weighed
more than their relative advantages. Thus, all else equal, the early option may outperform
later ones.2
Specifically, we consider a duopoly model with diﬀerentiated products where consumers
consider or try products sequentially. We suppose that consumers take the first product
as the reference point when they value the second one, and they exhibit loss aversion
in both the price dimension and the product dimension: they are excessively averse to
paying a price higher than the reference price or to having a product less well matched
than the reference product. Another ingredient of our model is that one firm might be
more “prominent” than the other in the sense that the prominent product is considered
first and so taken as the reference product by more consumers. The prominent product
could be the default option, the product which is more heavily advertised, the product
which is recommended or displayed more visibly in the store, and the product which
enters the market earlier and consumers first hear of. The main question we investigate
is how firms will strategically adjust their prices and product attributes to manipulate
consumers’ reference points in a competitive environment, and what the impact of this
strategic behavior on the market is.
Sections 2 and 3 investigate the pricing and welfare implications of consumer reference
dependence. Section 2 considers the case where all consumers take the same product as
the reference product. Such a relatively simple setting helps illustrate the key feature of
our model: firms’ price choices have a direct bearing on consumers’ price sensitivity. If the
reference firm charges a lower price than its rival, loss aversion in the price dimension makes
consumers more price sensitive; if the reference firm charges a higher price, loss aversion
in the product dimension makes the marginal consumer who must have a strong state for
the reference product less price sensitive. Graphically, the reference firm’s demand curve
has an inward kink at its rival’s price. In contrast, the other firm’s demand curve has
an outward kink. With this new function for price, the reference firm has an incentive
to randomize its price. It will either charge a lower price than its rival to earn a large
market share or charge a higher price to focus on high-value consumers. But the other
firm will charge a medium price constantly. We further show that, all else equal, the
1For example, Madrian and Shea (2001) identify a default eﬀect with employee savings plans. They find
that participation in such schemes is significantly higher under automatic enrollment, and a substantial
fraction of participants under automatic enrollment choose both the default contribution rate and fund
allocation even though few employees hired before automatic enrollment picked this particular outcome.
A similar default eﬀect in automobile insurance purchases is documented by Johnson et al. (1993). Ho
and Imai (2006) and Meredith and Salant (2007) observe that being listed first on the ballot paper can
significantly increase a candidate’s vote share. See also relevant experimental evidence in, for example,
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) and Kahneman et al. (1991).
2The reference-dependent eﬀect does not necessarily require that people possess the reference product
physically for a long time, though it might be more pronounced in that case. For example, in most of
experimental studies on the status quo bias and the endowment eﬀect, the time of possessing the object is
rather short and sometimes subjects only possess the object mentally. However, even in such situations,
subjects seem to be attached to the object strongly.
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reference product is on average more expensive and occupies a larger market share, and
the reference firm also earns a higher profit. Section 3 considers a more flexible setting
which allows for heterogenous reference products among consumers. There the prominent
firm plays the same role as the reference firm and similar results hold.
One implication of our price result is, if sellers in the market are not equally prominent,
the more prominent one (for instance, the seller advertising more heavily or that having an
advantageous location in a shopping area) may charge more volatile prices (for example,
put its product on sales more frequently). This oﬀers a new justification for the existence
of sales in the market:3 sales can be used to manipulate consumers’ price sensitivity when
a majority of consumers consider a certain product first in their market search process.4
The main welfare findings are: (i) More severe loss aversion could intensify price com-
petition, this harming firms and benefiting consumers. However, it usually leads to lower
total welfare in our setting with inelastic demand. This is mainly because more severe loss
aversion tends to enlarge the price diﬀerence between products and thus induce a worse
matching of consumers along the personal taste dimension. (ii) Although the prominent
product is on average more expensive, it may be better for consumers to consider it first,
because doing so will prevent them from being over “addicted” to the low price at the
expense of taste satisfaction.
Section 4 considers endogenous prominence and justifies asymmetric prominence as
an equilibrium outcome of an extended game. We first show that a greater prominence
diﬀerence between firms can boost each firm’s profit. The intuition is, when a firm becomes
relatively more prominent, it will rely more on those strong-taste consumers and so charge
the high price more frequently, which will relax the price competition. Based on this result,
we argue that if firms sell their products through a platform, the platform has an incentive
to make the two products unequally prominent; if firms have an advertising competition
and if advertising only increases product prominence, then ex ante identical firms may
diﬀerentiate their advertising intensities.
Section 5 studies the case with asymmetric product qualities. We show that a relative
increase of the prominent firm’s product quality could benefit both firms. This is because
letting consumers consider a higher quality product first can make them in aggregate less
price sensitive and thus relax price competition. Therefore, if there is a quality choice
stage prior to the price competition, the less prominent firm may have an incentive to
supply a lower-quality product than its prominent rival even if it is costless to improve
quality. This oﬀers an alternative explanation for quality diﬀerentiation in the market.5
3Sales can also be explained as a result of intertemporal price discrimination (Sobel (1984), for instance)
or price discrimination across captive and non-captive consumers (Varian (1980), for instance) in the single-
product market, or as the loss-leader pricing strategy in the multi-product market (Lal and Matutes (1994)).
See, for example, Hosken and Reiﬀen (2004) for a recent empirical study of sales.
4 In particular, our price prediction is also consistent with the observation that the prices of national
brands in supermarkets are often more volatile than the prices of private brands, if consumers tend to
regard the national brand as the reference point. For example, Slade (1998) documents that the private-
label prices of saltine crackers in U.S. are less volatile than major-manufacturer prices. Muller et al. (2006)
provide similar evidence that the average number of price changes is significantly smaller for private label
products than for national brands.
5 In the conventional literature on vertical product diﬀerentiation (Shaked and Sutton (1982), for in-
stance), due to a diﬀerent reason (consumers’ heterogeneous preferences over quality), firms also want to
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Related Literature:
Since the seminal work by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), it has been well established
that people’s preferences are often influenced by some reference point and characterized
by loss aversion.6 This behavioral regularity has been extensively applied to explain many
economic anomalies such as the endowment eﬀect, the status quo bias, and small-stake
risk aversion (see, for example, Kahneman and Tversky (2000), and Della Vigna (2007)).
However, relatively fewer articles investigate the firm’s response to consumer reference
dependence. Most of the existing works study how a monopoly firm makes its dynamic
pricing decision when consumers tend to regard the historical price as the reference price
(see, for example, Fibich et al. (2007) and references cited therein).7 A main result is, if
consumers display loss aversion, then the firm should charge a constant price.8
Nevertheless, competition is important for investigating the market implications of
consumer biases.9 Our work makes a step in this direction. A related recent paper is
Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2007). Following Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), they use consumers’
rational expectations of possible transaction results as the reference point. They then
argue that loss aversion might give rise to “focal pricing” in the sense that firms may
not adjust their prices even if their costs have changed and firms with diﬀerent costs may
charge the same price. A simple argument can go as follows. Suppose that consumers
expect to pay some fixed price before they enter the market. Then, due to loss aversion,
each firm’s demand will become more price responsive if its actual price is higher than that
expected fixed price, and so at that price the demand curve has an outward kink. This
could drive all firms to actually charge that fixed price for a range of cost conditions.10
The main diﬀerence between their model and ours is that consumers in their model take
the expectation as the reference point, so no individual firm’s actual decision can influence
it; while our reference point is some real product in the market, so firms can manipulate it
directly. This is the key reason why two models have diﬀerent pricing predictions. Since the
formation of reference points is usually context dependent, it is highly desirable to examine
how diﬀerent assumptions of reference points could lead to diﬀerent market implications.
In addition, we also investigate the impacts of consumer reference dependence on firms’
advertising and product quality choices.11
diﬀerentiate their qualities to soften price competition.
6Besides reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion, the other two elements of Kahneman and
Tversky’s prospect theory are diminishing sensitivity (which implies risk aversion in the domain of gains and
risk seeking in the domain of losses) and nonlinear decision weights (in the environment with uncertainty),
but they are irrelevant in our model.
7Putler (1992) is an early theoretical attempt to introduce the reference-price eﬀect into consumer
demand theory. Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) study the eﬀect of satisficing behavior and adjustable
aspiration levels on consumers’ dynamic choice, which bears some resemblance to the eﬀect of reference-
dependent preferences. However, neither paper studies how firms might respond to this non-standard
consumer behavior.
8 In contrast, if the eﬀect of a gain is greater than a same-size loss, the firm should price cyclically.
9 In addition, it is also desirable to take into account reference dependence in non-price product dimen-
sions. Some empirical research (Hardie et al. (1993), for instance) suggests that loss aversion is even more
severe in the product dimension than in the price dimension.
10See also their companion paper Heidhues and Koszegi (2005) which, among other results, shows a
similar price-stickiness result in a static monopoly setting.
11Other recent papers which study the implications of the reference-dependence eﬀect (in a broader sense)
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The reference-dependence eﬀect in our model can be regarded as a particular kind of
switching costs: moving from the reference product to the other involves psychological
costs if the latter is relatively inferior in some aspects. But it is rather diﬀerent from
the traditional switching costs in both specifications and consequences (see, for example,
Farrell and Klemperer (2007)). We will further discuss this diﬀerence in the end of Section
5.
Broadly, this paper also contributes to the emerging literature on behavioral industrial
organization. For instance, Della Vigna and Malmendier (2004), Eliaz and Spiegler (2006),
Gabaix and Laibson (2006), and Grubb (2006) study how firms might take advantage of
consumers’ limited abilities to forecast their future preferences. Armstrong and Chen
(2007), Rubinstein (1993), and Spiegler (2006a,b) investigate how the heuristic decision
making of consumers could induce firms to confuse consumers. Chen et al. (2005) and
Shapiro (2006) examine the market implications of consumers’ limited memory.
2 Single Reference Product
2.1 Model
There are two firms (1 and 2) in an industry, each supplying a distinct product at constant
common unit cost, which we normalize to zero. They set prices p1 and p2 simultaneously.
Consumers have diverse tastes for diﬀerent products. We model this scenario via the
Hotelling linear city. A consumer’s taste is represented by the parameter x which is
distributed on the interval [0, 1] according to a cumulative distribution function F (x)
which is diﬀerentiable and has a positive density f(x). Firm 1 is exogenously located at
the endpoint x = 0 and firm 2 is at the other endpoint x = 1. For a consumer at x, the
match utility of product 1 is v−x, and that of product 2 is v−(1−x), where v is the gross
utility of the product and is assumed to be suﬃciently large such that the whole market is
covered in equilibrium.12 Consumers have unit demand for one product, and the number
of consumers is normalized to one.
We introduce consumer reference dependence by considering a sequential-consideration
scenario: consumers consider or try products one by one, and a product’s price and match
utility are discovered when it is considered or tried. We assume that consumers will take
the first product they consider as the reference point. When they come to the second
one, they will value its relative advantage (lower price or higher match utility) in the
standard way, while they will over weigh its relative disadvantage (higher price or lower
match utility) in the spirit of loss aversion.13 We also assume that consumers do not
include, for example, Compte and Jehiel (2003) (prior oﬀers as reference points in sequential bargaining),
Eliaz and Spiegler (2007) (the default alternative as the reference point in forming consideration sets),
Hart and Moore (2007) (contracts as reference points in ex post trading relationship), and Rosenkranz and
Schmitz (2007) (reserve prices in auctions as reference points in deciding on bidding strategies).
12Alternatively, we can assume that a product’s match utility is a random draw from some common
distribution and its realization is independent across consumers and products. Our following analysis still
applies to this setting by modifying notation slightly.
13 In our model, the reference point is an individual product. An alternative specification of the reference
point could be a weighted average of all products a consumer has considered before making a purchase
decision. A product is more prominent if consumers put more weight on it. Our main results carry over
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intentionally choose the order in which they consider products, and they may just follow
some natural presentation order of products or be guided by firms’ marketing activities.
(See a discussion about more sophisticated consumers in Section 3.) In this section, for
simplicity we further suppose that all consumers will consider product 1 first (which is
the default option, for instance), and we call it the reference product. (We will treat a
more flexible setting in Section 3.)14
One point deserves mention before proceeding. Although sequential consideration is
a reasonable scenario to think about reference dependence, our model is actually not
restricted to this interpretation. What we need is that consumers somehow take some
product in the market as the reference point when they evaluate others. The details on
why some product becomes the reference point is not crucial to most of our following
analysis.
Consumer preferences are specified as follows. Given the prices p1 and p2, a consumer
at x values product 1, the reference product, in the standard way:
v − x− p1;
her valuation of product 2 is
v − (1− x)− p2 − (λ− 1)max{0, p2 − p1}− (λ− 1)max{0, 1− 2x},
where the first three terms represent the standard intrinsic surplus of product 2 and the
other two terms capture the potential reference-dependent “loss utility” in each dimension.
λ > 1 is the loss-aversion parameter and measures the strength of the reference-dependence
eﬀect.15 If λ = 1, we return to the orthodox Hotelling model. An implicit assumption
here is that the reference-dependent “loss utility” occurs separately in the price dimension
and the product dimension. It is psychologically reasonable and has been well supported
in the literature of prospect theory (see, for example, Tversky and Kahneman (1991)).
For simplicity, we have assumed the same degree of loss aversion in both dimensions.
Considering asymmetric degrees of loss aversion in the two dimensions will not aﬀect most
of our main results qualitatively.16
To highlight how reference dependence could benefit the reference product, we first
focus on the case with a symmetric distribution of consumers (i.e., F (1− x) = 1− F (x)).
to that case qualitatively. However, the assumption that the reference point is from the market rather
from outside (for example, some “ideal” product in a consumer’s mind before she enters the market) is
important.
14Our one-shot model may be more suitable for infrequently purchased products or for frequently pur-
chased products but with poor-memory consumers. Otherwise, the reference point might also be influenced
by the historical purchase.
15The strength of the reference-dependence eﬀect could be aﬀected by the time lag between considering
options. If the time lag is too long, people may have forgotten the first option when they value the second
one; if it is too short, people may have not adapted themselves to the first option when the second one
comes. Hence, the eﬀect might be most pronounced when the time lag is appropriate. Presumably, the
eﬀect would be also more pronounced if consumers encounter alternative options somehow unexpectedly.
If people have been expecting to consider other options when they encounter the first one, they may not
attach to it too much and so the reference dependence eﬀect might be weak.
16Our welfare results could be aﬀected if the degrees of loss aversion in the two dimensions diﬀer suﬃ-
ciently. We will discuss this issue in Section 3.
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That is, there is no systematic quality diﬀerence between the two products. (We will
discuss the impact of asymmetric qualities in Section 5.) We also assume away any possible
explicit costs involved in moving from one product to the other. Introducing such costs
will bring firm 1 with an extra advantage.
Now we are ready to derive each firm’s demand function. We claim that if firm 1
charges p1 < p2, its demand function is
q1(p1 < p2) = F
µ
1
2
+
λ
2
(p2 − p1)
¶
. (1)
This is because all consumers with x ≤ 12 will definitely buy product 1, and those with
x > 12 will buy product 1 only if the gain from product 2’s higher match utility is less
than the loss (including the psychological part) from its higher price, i.e., only if 2x− 1 <
λ(p2 − p1), which leads to
x <
1
2
+
λ
2
(p2 − p1).
It is ready to see that consumers are now more price sensitive than in the orthodox model
(which applies when λ = 1). This is because the attractiveness of firm 1’s lower price has
been amplified by consumers’ loss aversion in the price dimension.
When firm 1 charges p1 > p2, all consumers with x > 12 will buy product 2, and
those with x < 12 will choose product 1 only if the loss (including the psychological part)
from product 2’s lower match utility exceeds the gain from its lower price, i.e., only if
λ (1− 2x) > p1 − p2. Now those consumers with x < 12 become less price sensitive,
because the unattractiveness of firm 1’s higher price has appeared less important relative
to the unattractiveness of product 2’s lower match utility. The corresponding demand
function is
q1(p1 > p2) = F
µ
1
2
+
1
2λ
(p2 − p1)
¶
. (2)
(1) and (2) imply that, around p2, firm 1’s demand is more price responsive at p1 < p2
than at p1 > p2, and hence the demand curve has an inward kink at p1 = p2 (see Figure
1 below which illustrates the case with uniform x).
Firm 2’s demand is q2 = 1 − q1. Explicitly, using the symmetry of distribution, we
have
q2(p2 > p1) = F
µ
1
2
+
λ
2
(p1 − p2)
¶
; q2(p2 < p1) = F
µ
1
2
+
1
2λ
(p1 − p2)
¶
. (3)
When p2 > p1, the unattractiveness of firm 2’s higher price will be amplified by loss
aversion since consumers regard p1 as the reference price. When p2 < p1, the attractiveness
of its lower price to the marginal consumer at x < 12 will be reduced by her extra aversion
to product 2’s lower match utility. Clearly, around p1, firm 2’s demand is more price
responsive at p2 > p1 than at p2 < p1, which implies that q2 has an outward kink at
p2 = p1 (see Figure 1 below).
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Figure 1: An Illustration of Demand Curves
In sum, compared to the orthodox case, consumers will become more (less) price
sensitive if the reference product is cheaper (more expensive) than the other. Moreover,
consumer reference dependence benefits the reference firm but harms the other in the sense
that, at any pair of prices p1 6= p2, q1 increases but q2 decreases relative to the orthodox
case.
Two additional properties of the demand function deserve mention. First, q1 > q2 if
and only if p1 < p2. In eﬀect, reference dependence does not aﬀect each firm’s demanded
quantity if they charge the same price. However, it still aﬀects the price sensitivity at that
point. Second, at any fixed price pair p1 6= p2, both firms’ demand curves have the same
slope given q2 = 1 − q1.17 In the following, we denote by πi(p1, p2) = pi · qi(p1, p2) the
profit function of firm i.
2.2 Equilibrium
Now we derive the Nash equilibrium of the price competition. First of all, both firms
charging the same price is not an equilibrium. Given a positive price of firm 2, firm 1’s
demand has an inward kink at this price, which means that its profit function has a local
minimum at this point. Hence, charging the same price will never be firm 1’s best response.
Second, there is no asymmetric pure-strategy equilibrium either. Suppose p1 6= p2 were an
equilibrium. Since both firms face the same demand slope at this hypothetical equilibrium
point, in equilibrium the firm charging the higher price should have a higher demand.18
But that is impossible in our symmetric environment. We formalize the above argument
in the following proposition. All omitted proofs are presented in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 Given a symmetric distribution of consumers, the price competition has
no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
We will then show that, under regularity conditions, the game has a mixed-strategy
equilibrium in which firm 1 charges a low price pL1 with probability μ ∈ (0, 1) and a high
17This property does not depend on the assumption of a symmetric distribution of consumers.
18This is because, in a hypothetical asymmetric equilibrium, each firm’s demand function is smooth
around its own equilibrium price, and so we have the first-order conditions: q1 + p1 ∂q1∂p1 = q2 + p2
∂q2
∂p2
= 0.
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price pH1 with probability 1 − μ, and firm 2 charges a medium price p2 for sure. Given
firm 1’s mixed pricing strategy, let
qe2(p;μ, p
L
1 , p
H
1 ) = μ · q2(pL1 , p) + (1− μ) · q2(pH1 , p) (4)
be firm 2’s expected demand function. It has two outward kinks at pL1 and p
H
1 which
divide it into three segments (see Figure 2 below). The regularity conditions are:
Assumption 1 (i) f(x) is logconcave;19 (ii) for μ ∈ (0, 1) and 0 < pL1 < pH1 , each
segment of qe2 is regular such that the corresponding part of firm 2’s profit function is
quasi-concave.20
Notice that the uniform distribution (F (x) = x) satisfies Assumption 1 since then each
segment of qe2 is linear.
Proposition 2 Given a symmetric distribution of consumers and Assumption 1,21 there
exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium as specified in the above where the quadruplet (μ, pL1 , p
H
1 , p2)
satisfies the following conditions:
(i) p2 = argmaxp p · qe2(p;μ, pH1 , pL1 );
(ii) pL1 = argmaxp≤p2 p · q1(p, p2), and pH1 = argmaxp≥p2 p · q1(p, p2);
(iii) π1(pL1 , p2) = π1(p
H
1 , p2).
Conditions (i) and (ii) define each firm’s best response given its rival’s strategy, and
condition (iii) means that firm 1 is indiﬀerent between charging the low and the high price.
A potential complication is, if λ is suﬃciently large, firm 1 may occupy the whole market
when it charges the low price pL1 . As we discuss in Appendix A.2, such an equilibrium
with a corner solution can actually occur. However, in the main text of this paper (except
in Section 5), we focus on the interior-solution equilibrium in which no firm captures all
consumers (which requires relatively small λ).
We illustrate the equilibrium in Figure 2 below which is based on the uniform-distribution
case, where πi is firm i’s iso-profit curve. The intuition of this mixed-strategy equilibrium
is as follows. Given firm 2’s price, firm 1 can either charge a lower price to make consumers
more price sensitive and then earn a large market share, or charge a higher price to exploit
those consumers who have a strong taste for its product and will thus become less price
sensitive due to loss aversion in the taste dimension.22 Although these two strategies are
19The logconcavity condition is satisfied by many well-known (truncated if necessary) distributions. See,
for example, Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) for a detailed discussion.
20Since logconcave f implies logconcave F , firm 1’s demand in each side of its kink is logconcave such
that the corresponding part of its profit function is logconcave (so quasi-concave). (Remember that firm
1’s whole profit function will never be quasi-concave.) However, a weighted average of two logconcave
functions may fail to be logconcave. In our case, though q2(pi1, p) is logconcave under (i), qe2(p) defined in
(4) may not be. That is why we need (ii). But one can show that (i) implies (ii) if λ is close to one or if
f 0(0)
f(0) <
4
1+λpH1
. (The latter condition actually implies concave profit function of firm 2.)
21 If Assumption 1 fails to be satisfied, we may have other types of mixed-strategy equilibrium. But note
that the general existence of equilibrium is no problem according to the Glicksberg Theorem, since each
firm’s profit function is continuous and we can restrict each firm’s feasible prices to a compact interval.
22This argument does not apply to firm 2. Given fixed p1, if firm 2 charges a higher price, consumers
will become more price sensitive, which will drive firm 2 to lower its price; if firm 2 charges a lower price
than p1, the marginal consumer who has a strong taste for product 1 will become less price sensitive, which
will drive firm 2 to raise its price.
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equally profitable in equilibrium, firm 1 will not adopt either strategy predictably. Oth-
erwise, firm 2 would either be attempted to charge a low price to steal business when pH1
applies, or be forced to match pL1 to protect its own market share. Either situation will
lower firm 1’s profit, so firm 1 has an incentive to randomize its price and keep firm 2
guessing.
Figure 2: An Illustration of the Equilibrium
• The robustness of equilibrium. Readers may wonder whether there are other
types of mixed-strategy equilibrium in our model. A suﬃcient condition for the uniqueness
of our equilibrium is, on top of Assumption 1, for any possible mixed pricing strategy of
firm 1, firm 2’s expected profit function will be globally quasi-concave. We do not have
primitive conditions for this, but it is satisfied at least by the uniform distribution as we
will show in Section 3.
Our equilibrium is robust to heterogenous reference points among consumers. For
example, when product 1 is more heavily advertised than product 2, more than half
consumers may notice and consider product 1 first and others may notice product 2 first.
We will investigate such a general setting in Section 3, and there we will show that a similar
equilibrium exists provided that the two products are not equally noticeable. It is also not
diﬃcult to extend our model to the case with more than two firms, if consumers still take
some product as the reference point in evaluating others.23 No fundamental changes will
take place since how firms’ price choices aﬀect the price sensitivity of consumers remains
unchanged.
23However, if in the sequential-consideration scenario consumers’ reference points evolve as the search
process goes on, then the situation could become complicated, depending on how the evolution process is
specified.
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Another issue is about the assumption of symmetric distributions. From the proofs
of Propositions 1 and 2, we can see that this assumption can be replaced by a weaker
condition: F (12) =
1
2 . Beyond this, will our mixed-strategy equilibrium still persist?
The following proposition tells us that, given the degree of loss aversion, our equilibrium
continues to hold provided that the distribution is not too skewed to either endpoint.
Proposition 3 Given Assumption 1,
(i) for fixed λ, there exists ε > 0 such that, when
¯¯
F (12)−
1
2
¯¯
< ε, there is no pure-
strategy equilibrium, and a similar mixed-strategy equilibrium as before exists;
(ii) for fixed
¯¯
F (12)−
1
2
¯¯
> 0, there exists λ∗ > 1 such that, when λ < λ∗, there is only
a pure-strategy equilibrium with p1 > p2 if F (12) >
1
2 and p1 < p2 if F (
1
2) <
1
2 .
Part (ii) of this proposition means that, given an asymmetric distribution, if the degree
of loss aversion is suﬃciently low, pure-strategy equilibrium will emerge. We will further
illustrate this result in Section 5 when we discuss asymmetric product qualities (which is
a special case of asymmetric distributions).
• The benefit of selling the reference product. We then investigate whether
the reference firm enjoys an advantage over its rival merely due to consumer reference
dependence. As we can see from the demand function, if the reference firm charges a
higher price than its rival, the shrink of its market share will be mitigated by consumers’
loss aversion in the product dimension; and if it charges a lower price, the expansion of its
market share will be amplified by consumers’ loss aversion in the price dimension. In either
case, consumer reference dependence favors the reference firm. Thus, we should expect
that the reference firm will earn more the other. In addition, we will also compare the
two firms’ average prices and market shares, of which the results are not easy to predict
in advance given the mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Given a symmetric distribution of consumers and Assumption 1, in the
mixed-strategy equilibrium we have identified,
(i) firm 1 charges the high price more frequently (μ < 12) and product 1 is on average
more expensive than product 2 (pe1 = μp
L
1 + (1− μ)pH1 > p2);
(ii) on average firm 1 occupies a (weakly) larger market share than firm 2 (qe2 ≤ 12),
and they share the market equally if and only if the distribution is uniform;
(iii) firm 1 earns strictly higher profit than firm 2.
There are two other questions deserving investigation. First, how will price and welfare
vary with the degree of loss aversion? Second, given firms’ equilibrium pricing strategies,
if consumers realize their own biases and can choose the consideration order freely, is it
really in their own interests to consider the reference product first? Due to the tractability
issue, we discuss them in the uniform-distribution case in next section.
3 Heterogeneous Reference Products
This section allows for heterogenous reference products among consumers. Specifically, we
now suppose that 12+θ of consumers will consider product 1 first and take it as the reference
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product, while 12 − θ of consumers will take product 2 as the reference product. Without
loss of generality, let θ ∈ [0, 12 ]. When θ > 0, we say product 1 is more “prominent”
than product 2, and θ indicates the prominence diﬀerence between the two products.
This flexible setting will allow us to discuss endogenous prominence through advertising
competition in Section 4.
3.1 The general case
Each firm now has two demand sources: those consumers regarding its product as a
reference point and those regarding its rival’s product as a reference point. When firm 1
charges p1 < p2, its demand function becomes
q1(p1 < p2) = (
1
2
+ θ)F
µ
1
2
+
λ
2
(p2 − p1)
¶
+ (
1
2
− θ)F
µ
1
2
+
1
2λ
(p2 − p1)
¶
.
The first part is the same as before, and the second part is because, among consumers
who regard product 2 as the reference product, the marginal consumer is now at x > 12
and she will become less price sensitive due to her extra aversion to the less well matched
product 1. Similarly,
q1(p1 > p2) = (
1
2
+ θ)F
µ
1
2
+
1
2λ
(p2 − p1)
¶
+ (
1
2
− θ)F
µ
1
2
+
λ
2
(p2 − p1)
¶
.
For θ ∈ (0, 12), we have
lim
p1→p−2
q01(p1 < p2) = −
1
2
f(
1
2
)
∙
(
1
2
+ θ)λ+ (
1
2
− θ) 1
λ
¸
< lim
p1→p+2
q01(p1 > p2) = −
1
2
f(
1
2
)
∙
(
1
2
− θ)λ+ (1
2
+ θ)
1
λ
¸
,
which means that q1 has an inward kink at p1 = p2. Firm 2’s demand function can
be treated similarly and it has an outward kink at p2 = p1. Therefore, compared to
the single-reference-product case, we should not expect any qualitative changes to take
place. The counterparts of Propositions 1—3 can be proved similarly but with heavier
notation. Although the counterpart of Proposition 4 has not been established completely,
we conjecture it would hold. We will verify it in the uniform-distribution case below, and
we can also verify it when λ is close to one.24
24When λ = 1 + ε and ε tends to zero, equilibrium prices can be approximated as
pL1 ≈ p
∙
1− θε+
µ
3θ2 − 1− θ
2
−A
¶
ε2
¸
,
pH1 ≈ p
∙
1 + θε+
µ
3θ2 − 1 + θ
2
−A
¶
ε2
¸
,
p2 ≈ p
∙
1 + (2θ2 − 1
2
)ε2
¸
, μ ≈ 1
2
− (θ
2
+
A
2θ
)ε,
where p = 1/f( 1
2
) is the equilibrium price in the standard Hotelling model and A = θ
2p3
16
f 00( 1
2
). The
complication in this limit analysis is that we need the second-order price approximations to proceed welfare
analysis. This is because, when ε→ 0, we find λ has no first-order eﬀect on all welfare variables. (But it
turns out that, for μ, the first-order approximation is enough.) All details about the limit analysis in this
paper are available from the author.
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A notable exception is θ = 0 (in which case the two products are equally prominent).
In this symmetric case, the demand functions are smooth and we have a symmetric pure-
strategy equilibrium with
p∗ =
2
(λ+ 1/λ)f(1/2)
.
Compared to the standard Hotelling model where λ = 1, loss aversion leads to lower
equilibrium price since λ+ 1λ > 2. However, any extent of prominence diﬀerence between
the two firms will overturn this equilibrium.
3.2 The uniform-distribution case
In the following, we will proceed our analysis in the uniform-distribution case with asym-
metric prominence (i.e., θ > 0). One justification for asymmetric prominence will be
provided in Section 4 where we consider endogenous prominence through advertising com-
petition.
We first introduce two pieces of notation:
h = (
1
2
+ θ)λ+ (
1
2
− θ) 1
λ
, l = (
1
2
− θ)λ+ (1
2
+ θ)
1
λ
.
Clearly, h > l when θ > 0. Then the two firms’ demand functions can be written as
q1 =
1
2
+
i
2
(p2 − p1), q2 =
1
2
+
i
2
(p1 − p2),
where i = h if p1 < p2 and i = l if p1 > p2. So the demand is more price responsive when
the prominent product is relatively cheaper. When firm 1 uses the mixed strategy as in
Section 2, firm 2’s expected demand function is
qe2(p2) =
1
2
+
μh
2
(pL1 − p2) +
(1− μ)l
2
(pH1 − p2), (5)
for p2 ∈ [pL1 , pH1 ].
In this uniform setting, the following condition guarantees the mixed-strategy equilib-
rium with an interior solution:
1 < r =
r
h
l
< 3. (6)
In particular, when θ = 12 , we have h = λ and l =
1
λ , so (6) requires λ < 3. For smaller θ,
(6) is easier to hold. For example, when θ tends to zero, h and l will coincide, and so (6)
is always true.
We first derive equilibrium. (Note that, in the uniform setup, all following necessarily
conditions are also suﬃcient.) Given p2, firm 1’s best responses imply
pL1 =
1
2h
+
p2
2
; pH1 =
1
2l
+
p2
2
.
And the indiﬀerence condition requires
pL1
∙
1
2
+
h
2
(p2 − pL1 )
¸
= pH1
∙
1
2
+
l
2
(p2 − pH1 )
¸
.
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From them, we solve
pL1 =
1
2
∙
1
h
+
1√
hl
¸
=
1 + r
2h
,
pH1 =
1
2
∙
1
l
+
1√
hl
¸
=
r(1 + r)
2h
,
p2 =
1√
hl
=
r
h
.
With the expected demand function in (5), firm 2’s best response implies
2 [μh+ (1− μ)l] p2 = 1 + μhpL1 + (1− μ)lpH1 , (7)
from which we get
μ =
1
1 + r
.
It is ready to see that pL1 < p2 < p
H
1 and μ ∈ (0, 12). For this solution to be a real
equilibrium, we further need that no firm captures all consumers. Simple calculation
shows that firm 1’s demands are
qL1 =
1 + r
4
, qH1 =
1 + r
4r
when it charges pL1 and p
H
1 , respectively. So (6) indeed guarantees an interior-solution
equilibrium.
Moreover, this is the unique equilibrium. Since firm 2’s demand function is strictly
concave for any fixed p1 in this uniform setting, its expected demand function is also
strictly concave for any mixed pricing strategy of firm 1. Firm 2 will therefore never
randomize its price. On the other hand, for any fixed p2, firm 1’s demand function is
linear in each side of its kink, so it is impossible for firm 1 to have more than two best
replies.
We then study the properties of equilibrium. Define
4L = p2 − pL1 =
r − 1
2h
; 4H = pH1 − p2 =
r(r − 1)
2h
.
Then 4H
4L = r > 1, (8)
which means that, relative to firm 2’s price, pH1 deviates more than p
L
1 . On the other hand,
firm 1 charges the high price pH1 more frequently since μ <
1
2 . These two observations
imply that product 1 is on average more expensive than product 2:
pe1 =
1 + r2
2h
> p2 =
r
h
.
One can check that firm 1’s expected demand is just 12 . That is, on average both firms
share the market equally though firm 1 is more prominent.25 But firm 1 earns more than
firm 2:
π1 =
1
8
∙
1√
h
+
1√
l
¸2
=
(1 + r)2
8h
> π2 =
p2
2
=
r
2h
. (9)
25This result is not a general property as Proposition 4 has suggested.
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Thus, similar results as in Proposition 4 have been established in this heterogenous-
reference-product setting with the uniform distribution.
We now answer those two questions proposed in the end of Section 2.
• Which product should consumers consider first? In our model, the order
in which consumers consider product is specified exogenously or determined by firms’
marketing activities such as advertising. We have not yet consider the question that,
if consumers realize their own behavioral biases and can choose their own consideration
orders freely, how they will behave given that firms adopt the above equilibrium pricing
strategies and they are distinguishable in the market.
We first set the welfare criterion. Throughout this paper, we take the view that the
psychological “loss utility” only occurs in the decision process, and it aﬀects the ultimate
welfare status of consumers only through influencing their choices. Hence, we use the
orthodox welfare measurement.26 Also remember that consumers do not know a product’s
match utility until they consider it, so consumers are ex ante identical. Since pe1 > p2,
people may conjecture that those considering product 2 first would obtain higher surplus.
This conjecture, however, is not true.
Define
xL =
1
2
+
λ
2
4L; xH = 1
2
− 1
2λ
4H . (10)
For a consumer considering product 1 first, if its price is pi1, she will buy product 1 if and
only if her location is less than xi, so her expected surplus is v − αi, where
αi =
Z xi
0
(x+ pi1)dx+
Z 1
xi
(1− x+ p2) dx
is the sum of expected taste loss and expected payment. Thus, given firms’ strategies,
the expected surplus of a consumer who considers product 1 first is v− μαL− (1− μ)αH .
Similarly, define
yL =
1
2
+
1
2λ
4L; yH = 1
2
− λ
2
4H . (11)
Then, the expected surplus of a consumer who considers product 2 first is v−μβL− (1−
μ)βH , where
βi =
Z yi
0
(x+ pi1)dx+
Z 1
yi
(1− x+ p2)dx.
Therefore, considering product 1 first is better if
μαL + (1− μ)αH < μβL + (1− μ)βH . (12)
One can verify
αL − βL =
Z xL
yL
(2x− 1)dx| {z }
Increase of Taste Loss
−
Z xL
yL
4Ldx| {z }
Saving of Payment
=
M
4
42L > 0,
26Even if we add the “loss utility” to welfare calculation, our following result still holds if λ is relatively
small.
15
where M = (λ− 1/λ) (λ+ 1/λ− 2) > 0. This means that, when firm 1 is charging
the low price, considering its product first is actually worse than considering product 2
first. Two conflicting forces work here. On the one hand, if a consumer considers the
cheaper product first, she will become excessively averse to paying a higher price due to
loss aversion, and so she will be more likely to buy product 1 (i.e., xL > yL), which of
course can save expected payment. On the other hand, relative to the socially optimal
situation in which consumers should buy the most matched product regardless of the price
diﬀerence, xL > yL > 12 implies that considering the cheaper product 1 first will result
in more severe product-choice distortion and so involve a greater expected taste loss. It
turns out that the latter negative eﬀect dominates in our setting. Similarly, we have
αH − βH =
Z xH
yH
(2x− 1 +4H)dx = −M
4
42H < 0.
That is, when firm 1 is charging the high price, considering its product first is actually
better.
Now (12) becomes μ42L < (1− μ)42H , which, according to (8), is equivalent to
μ
1− μ < r
2.
But this inequality must be true since μ < 12 and r > 1.
Therefore, in the uniform-distribution setting with the orthodox welfare criterion, con-
sidering the more prominent product 1 first will yield higher expected consumer surplus.
The reason is that considering the more expensive product first will prevent consumers
from being over “addicted” to the low price at the expense of taste satisfaction.27 ,28
• The impact of loss aversion. We now turn to examine how price and welfare
vary with the degree of loss aversion. We will show that, when the prominence diﬀerence
between the two firms is relatively small, more severe loss aversion will intensify price
competition, harm firms and benefit consumers (which is consistent with the observation
at θ = 0); when the prominence diﬀerence is relatively large, more severe loss aversion
will tend to increase industry profit and harm consumers. In either case, more severe loss
aversion leads to lower total welfare in our inelastic-demand setting.
We first present some useful observations (remember r =
q
h
l ):
h l hl r
λ + ? + +
27We conjecture that this result would even hold for a general distribution, which can be verified at least
in the limit case with λ close to one. However, if the extent of loss aversion in the price dimension is rather
weak, then the result could be reversed. In particular, if there is no loss aversion in the price dimension,
then M = (1− 1/λ)(1 + 1/λ− 1) < 0 and so considering product 2 first is better.
28One implication of our result is that, if consumers are sophisticated and they are able to choose their
consideration order freely, our game with ex ante symmetric firms has three equilibria. In the symmetric
pure-strategy equilibrium (with θ = 0), expecting both firms are charging the same price, consumers will
consider products in a random order, which will further sustain the symmetric equilibrium. In the other
two asymmetric equilibria (with θ = 1
2 and −
1
2 , respectively), expecting one firm is charging a random but
on average higher price, consumers will visit this firm first, which will also further sustain the asymmetric
equilibrium.
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In this table, “+” means the variable in the row increases with the parameter in the
column, and “?” means a possible non-monotonic relationship.29 (Note that, when θ = 12 ,
hl = 1 is independent of λ. This caveat applies to all following analysis.)
Price. It is ready to see that both p2 = 1/
√
hl and pL1 =
1
2h +
p2
2 fall with λ. But p
H
1
may vary with λ non-monotonically. Figure 3 below is a numerical example with θ = 0.3
where the thin line is p2.
0.5
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Figure 3: Prices and λ
In particular, from pH1 =
1
2l +
p2
2 , we can see that p
H
1 will fall with λ if l increases with λ,
which is true if (see footnote 29)
λ2 >
1/2 + θ
1/2− θ . (13)
This condition is easier to hold for higher λ and lower θ. For example, when θ tends to
zero, it is always true; when θ tends to 12 , it fails for sure.
30 Roughly speaking, for smaller
θ, firm 1’s profit from exploiting those strong-taste consumers by charging a high price
will go down since now fewer of them will visit firm 1 first.
Profit. It is clear that π2 = p2/2 decreases with λ. But π1 could vary with λ non-
monotonically.31 In particular, since π1 = 18(h
−1/2+l−1/2)2 (see (9)), a suﬃcient condition
for π1 to be decreasing with λ is also (13) given h increases with λ. Therefore, it is possible
(at least under (13)) that more severe loss aversion will intensify competition and harm
both firms.32
Consumer surplus and welfare. Remember that our welfare measurement does
not include the psychological “loss utility”. Let W be total welfare and W = v−T , where
T =
1
4
£
1 + μAL42L + (1− μ)AH42H
¤
(with AL = h(λ+1/λ)− 1 and AH = l(λ+1/λ)− 1) is the overall taste loss. Notice that,
if both firms charge the same price, then each consumer will buy the product she most
29 It is ready to show ∂l∂λ =
1
2
− θ − ( 1
2
+ θ)λ−2. Thus, l increases with λ if and only if λ2 > 1/2+θ
1/2−θ for
θ < 1
2
.
30For θ = 1
2
, p2 is a constant, and so pH1 increases with λ.
31One can show that ∂π1∂λ has the sign of
θ(r3−1)
2 (1+λ
−2)− r3+14 (1−λ
−2). Thus, when θ tends to zero,
∂π1
∂λ < 0; when θ tends to
1
2 ,
∂π1
∂λ > 0; and for intermediate θ, π1 could be non-monotonic with λ.
32However, it is also possible that more severe loss aversion will boost industry profit. This will happen
at least when θ is close to 1
2 , because at θ =
1
2 , π2 is a constant and π1 increases with λ.
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likes, which is socially optimal and leads to the minimum taste loss 14 . When consumers
exhibit reference dependence and θ > 0, there exists price diﬀerence between products,
which will cause distortion in product choice. Specifically, when firm 1 charges pi1 and
firm 2 charges p2, the eﬃciency loss is
(
1
2
+ θ)(xi −
1
2
)2 + (
1
2
− θ)(yi −
1
2
)2 =
1
4
Ai42i
where xi and yi have been defined in (10) and (11). Consumer surplus is V = v−T−π1−π2.
We consider the simple case with θ = 12 first. In this case, one can check 4T − 1 =
(λ− 1)2/4λ which goes up with λ, and so more severe loss aversion is detrimental to total
welfare (and consumer surplus in the light of footnote 32). This welfare result is mainly
driven by the fact that 4i increases with λ and larger price gaps imply greater product-
choice distortion and so lower eﬃciency. For θ < 12 , numerical simulations suggest that
W still decreases with λ (see Figure 4 below where from the bottom to the top θ ranges
from 0.1 to 0.5), but how V varies with λ depends on θ.33 Figure 5 below indicates that
more severe loss aversion will be beneficial to consumers themselves when θ is relatively
low. This is because, when θ is lower, it is more likely that higher λ will decrease all prices
(see (13)).
0.25
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Figure 4: T and λ
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Figure 5: T + π1 + π2 and λ
Discussion:
Now we discuss how asymmetric degrees of loss aversion in the two dimensions will
aﬀect our results. The influence can be seen from two extreme cases. (i) If loss aversion
occurs only in the price dimension, all analysis applies if we use h = (12 +θ)λ+(
1
2 −θ) and
l = (12 − θ)λ+ (
1
2 + θ). Clearly, both h and l increases with λ. One can verify that more
severe loss aversion will then always intensify price competition such that all prices and
profits decrease with λ and consumer surplus increases with λ. So loss aversion in the price
dimension is pro-competitive. (ii) If loss aversion occurs only in the taste dimension, all
analysis also applies as long as we use h = (12 + θ)+ (
1
2 − θ)/λ and l = (
1
2 − θ)+ (
1
2 + θ)/λ.
Now both h and l decreases with λ. It is not diﬃcult to check that more severe loss
version will now always soften price competition such that all prices and profits increase
with λ and consumer surplus decreases with λ. So loss aversion in the taste dimension
is anti-competitive. In either case, total welfare in our inelastic-demand setting still goes
33We should be cautious of this total welfare result, because our unit-demand model does not reflect
output eﬃciency. If higher λ could also give rise to lower prices even in an elastic-demand model, more
severe loss aversion could lead to higher total output and so higher eﬃciency.
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down with λ. Our model with symmetric degrees of loss aversion is just a combination of
these two extreme cases.
4 Endogenous Prominence: Platform and Advertising Com-
petition
In this section, we discuss two possible ways to endogenize prominence. One story is to
consider a platform (for example, a supermarket) on which firms sell products. Suppose
firms can set product prices by themselves and the platform can charge each of them a
fee proportional to their profit. Then does the platform have an incentive to manipulate
consumers’ consideration order through adjusting the relative prominence among products
(for example, displaying some product more visibly or recommending some product to
consumers)? The other story is to consider advertising competition. For example, a
consumer might first notice and then consider the product whose adverts first come to
her attention, and then the more heavily advertised product is more prominent in the
market.34 Then what is the equilibrium of advertising competition?
The key step of our analysis is to know how θ aﬀects each firm’s profit. Without loss
of generality, we focus on θ > 0. We first consider the uniform setting in Section 3. It
is easy to see that π2 = p2/2 increases with θ by noticing p2 = 1/
√
hl and hl falls with
θ. One can also show π1 = 18(h
−1/2 + l−1/2)2 increases with θ.35 Therefore, a greater
prominence diﬀerence between firms will benefit both firms. The intuition is, when more
consumers consider product 1 first, firm 1 will rely more on those strong-taste consumers
and so charge the high price more frequently, which will further relax the price competition
in an environment where prices are strategic complements. Figure 6 below is a numerical
example with λ = 2. For a general distribution, we have the same result at least in the
limit case with λ close to one.36
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Figure 6: Profit and θ
34The advertising story also applies to the case in which the platform can sell prominent placements to
firms.
35This is because the derivative of the bracket term with respect to θ has the sign of 1
l
√
l
− 1
h
√
h
> 0.
One can further show that both profit functions are convex in θ.
36When λ = 1 + ε and ε tends to zero, using the approximations in footnote 24, we can approximate
equilibrium profits as π1 ≈ p2 + (
3
2
θ2 − 1
4
)pε2 and π2 ≈ p2 + (θ
2 − 1
4
)pε2. Both of them are increasing and
convex in θ.
19
Given such a result, the answer to the platform story is easy to see: the platform will
make one product more prominent than the other. Now let us consider the advertising-
competition story. If advertising competition occurs prior to price competition and the ad-
vertising technology is symmetric among firms, then two observations immediately follow.
First, both firms advertising at the same positive level is not an equilibrium outcome. This
is because otherwise each firm could then improve profit by reducing advertising unilater-
ally. Second, if the two firms advertise at diﬀerent intensities, then the firm advertising less
must actually not advertise at all. Otherwise, it could always increase profit by reducing
advertising and further enlarging the prominence diﬀerence. Thus, if we focus on pure-
strategy advertising equilibrium, the two firms will either diﬀerentiate their advertising
intensities (i.e., one advertises and the other does not) or both not advertise. Furthermore,
if advertising is not too costly, the latter can neither be an equilibrium outcome, which
leaves asymmetric advertising as the only possible pure-strategy equilibrium. Hence, con-
sumer reference dependence might give rise to endogenous asymmetric prominence as a
result of advertising competition.37
5 Reference Dependence and Product Qualities
We now return to the setting with exogenous prominence and explore how consumer
reference dependence could shape firms’ product quality choices. We will first study the
properties of equilibrium with two products diﬀering in their qualities. The main finding
is, when mixed-strategy equilibrium occurs, a relative increase of the prominent product’s
quality will soften price competition and benefit both firms. We then deduce that the less
prominent firm may want to choose a lower quality level than its prominent rival even if
improving quality is costless.
Let vi be product i’s gross utility, and define 4 = v1 − v2 to be the quality diﬀerence
between the two products. We assume that firm 1 is exogenously more prominent and
1
2 + θ of consumers will consider it first. Denote by xˆ the solution to v1−x = v2− (1−x).
Then the consumer at
xˆ =
1
2
+
4
2
is indiﬀerent between the two products if there is no price diﬀerence. To make the situation
interesting, we focus on mild quality diﬀerence 4 ∈ (−1, 1) such that xˆ ∈ (0, 1). That
is, no firm will occupy the whole market if they charge the same price. For tractability,
we focus on the uniform setting again. One can check that now the demand functions
become38
q1 = xˆ+
i
2
(p2 − p1), q2 = 1− xˆ+
i
2
(p1 − p2),
where i = h if p1 < p2 and i = l if p1 > p2.
37 It is straightforward to write down a formal model of advertising competition in which we can show
the existence of pure-strategy advertising equilibrium under certain conditions. We can also discuss the
properties of possible mixed-strategy advertising equilibrium. The details are available from the author.
38We are implicitly assuming that consumers regard personal taste and product quality together as the
product dimension. This assumption is reasonable when consumers only have an overall impression of
product satisfaction.
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We derive equilibrium first. Now the equilibrium will be either pure-strategy or mixed-
strategy depending on the magnitude of quality diﬀerence relative to the strength of ref-
erence dependence. If there is no consumer reference dependence and 4 > 0, clearly firm
1 will charge a higher price than firm 2. When the psychological bias emerges, charging
a lower price than its rival will also become an attractive strategy to firm 1, because that
will expand its market share substantially (remember firm 1 is more prominent). Hence,
we expect that, for fixed quality diﬀerence, when the psychological bias becomes stronger
gradually, the equilibrium should evolve from a pure-strategy one to a mixed-strategy one.
Let us keep the notation r =
q
h
l which increases with λ and θ, and define
a(x) =
2− x
x
; b(x) = 3
r
1− x
5− 5x− x2 .
Then we have the following result:
Proposition 5 With the uniform distribution and the quality diﬀerence 4 ∈ (−1, 1),
(i) we have the mixed-strategy equilibrium with an interior solution (i.e., qL1 < 1) if
1
r
<
a(xˆ)
3
< r < a(xˆ) for xˆ ∈ (0,
√
3− 1), (14)
and we have the mixed-strategy equilibrium with a corner solution (i.e., qL1 = 1) if(
r > a(xˆ) for xˆ ∈ (0,
√
3− 1)
r > b(xˆ) for xˆ ∈ (
√
3− 1, x˜), (15)
where x˜ ≈ 0.854 is the solution to 5− 5x− x2 = 0.
(ii) We have the pure-strategy equilibrium with p1 > p2 if
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
r < 3/a(xˆ) for xˆ ∈ (1/2,
√
3− 1)
r < b(xˆ) for xˆ ∈ (
√
3− 1, x˜)
any r for xˆ > x˜,
(16)
and we have the pure-strategy equilibrium with p1 < p2 if
r <
a(xˆ)
3
for xˆ ∈ (0, 1/2). (17)
Figure 7 below describes the relationship between equilibrium and the parameter pair
(r, xˆ), where the horizontal axis is xˆ and the vertical axis is r.
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Figure 7: Equilibrium and (r, xˆ)
In the area below the solid lines, we have pure-strategy equilibrium. In the area above
them, we have mixed-strategy equilibrium. This area is further divided by the dashed line
a(xˆ). Below that, we have the interior-solution equilibrium, and above that, we have the
corner-solution equilibrium. When r <
√
3 (i.e., below the horizontal dashed line), there is
no mixed-strategy equilibrium with a corner solution for any xˆ. We observe that, for fixed
r, mixed-strategy equilibrium is more likely to occur for smaller quality diﬀerence; and for
fixed xˆ < x˜ ≈ 0.854, mixed-strategy equilibrium is more likely to occur for greater r (so
for greater θ or λ). (In particular, when there is no quality diﬀerence (i.e., when xˆ = 12),
we only have mixed-strategy equilibrium.) These two observations illustrate Proposition
3.
We now turn to investigate the properties of equilibrium. In the pure-strategy equi-
librium, we can show
p1 =
2
i
· 1 + xˆ
3
, π1 =
2
i
µ
1 + xˆ
3
¶2
;
p2 =
2
i
· 2− xˆ
3
, π2 =
2
i
µ
2− xˆ
3
¶2
,
where i = l if xˆ > 12 and i = h if xˆ <
1
2 . It is clear that p1 and π1 increase with xˆ while
p2 and π2 decrease with xˆ. Thus, a relative increase of firm 1’s quality will benefit firm 1
but hurt firm 2. This is consistent with the result in the orthodox model with λ = 1.
However, the situation is very diﬀerent in the mixed-strategy equilibrium. Our discus-
sion is based on the interior-solution case. (In Appendix A.5 we establish the similar results
in the corner-solution case.) First, from (33) and (34), we see that all prices increase with
xˆ and μ decreases with xˆ (i.e., firm 1 will charge the high price more frequently when
its relative quality rises). Second, following the proof of Proposition 5, simple calculation
yields
π1 =
(1 + r)2
2h
xˆ2, π2 =
2r
3h
(2− xˆ)xˆ.
It is clear that each firm’s profit increases with xˆ since xˆ < 1. That is, a relative increase
of the prominent firm’s quality will benefit both firms.
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The results concerning firm 1 are not surprising, and here we try to understand the
results concerning firm 2. When firm 1’s relative quality increases, several forces aﬀect
firm 2’s pricing incentive. Let us see its first-order condition p2 = qe2/(−
∂qe2
∂p2 ), where q
e
2 is
its expected demand defined in (32). (i) Given prices, higher xˆ reduces qe2 directly since
firm 2 is then relatively less favored by consumers. This will drive firm 2 to lower its
price. (ii) Higher xˆ causes higher prices of firm 1 and lower μ, which will enhance qe2 and
give firm 2 an incentive to raise its price. (Note that this is the standard strategic eﬀect
in an environment where prices are strategic complements.) (iii) Lower μ also decreases
−∂q
e
2
∂p2 =
1
2(μh + (1 − μ)l) (i.e., makes firm 2’s expected demand less price responsive).
This is because consumers in aggregate are less price sensitive when firm 1 charges the
high price. This will further motivate firm 2 to raise its price. The first two eﬀects are
standard, but the third one is only present in the mixed-strategy equilibrium caused by
consumers reference dependence. Our result implies that the latter two positive eﬀects
together outweigh the first negative one. In light of this price result, the profit result is
not diﬃcult to understand.
We further illustrate the above results in the following two graphs which are based on
a numerical example with θ = 12 and λ = 2.
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Figure 8: Equilibrium Prices and xˆ
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Figure 9: Equilibrium Profit and xˆ
They describe how equilibrium prices and profit vary with xˆ, respectively. (The thick lines
correspond to firm 1, and the dashed parts correspond to the mixed-strategy equilibrium.)
The main implication of the above results is, when the quality diﬀerence between the
two products is not too large (such that the mixed-strategy pricing equilibrium occurs),
the less prominent firm has no incentive to improve its quality slightly even if it is costless
to do so. This is because it does not want to trigger the prominent firm to charge a low
price more frequently. Put diﬀerently, the less prominent firm even has an incentive to
reduce its quality even if doing so does not save any costs. We then deduce, if one firm is
more prominent than the other and if there is a (simultaneous) quality choice stage before
the price competition, choosing the same positive quality level will never be an equilibrium
outcome. This is because at xˆ = 12 we must have the mixed-strategy equilibrium and then
π2 increases with xˆ (i.e., reducing quality is profitable for firm 2). This also implies, at
least when the range of feasible quality levels is restricted such that there is no possibility
for pure-strategy pricing equilibrium, the less prominent firm will choose a lower quality
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level than its prominent rival even if improving quality is costless.39,40
We summarize the main results in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 (i) With the uniform distribution and product 1’s relative quality “advan-
tage” 4 ∈ (−1, 1), the prominent firm 1’s prices and profit always increase with 4. Firm
2’s price and profit decrease with 4 in the pure-strategy equilibrium, but increase with 4
the mixed-strategy equilibrium.
(ii) Suppose there is a quality choice stage prior to the price competition. Then in
equilibrium the two firms will never choose the same quality level. Moreover, at least when
the range of feasible quality levels is relatively narrow, the less prominent firm will choose
a lower quality level than its prominent rival even if improving quality is costless.
Discussion:
The reference-dependence eﬀect in our model can be regarded as a kind of switching
cost. But it occurs only if the second product is relatively inferior to the first one in at
least one aspect. Readers may wonder whether the results we have derived in this paper
could be replicated by using an exogenous cost involved in moving from one product to
the other. In that setting, all else equal, the prominent firm will also earn more than the
other, but we cannot establish other main results. Suppose the cost is s. Then, with the
same notation, the demand functions are:
q1(p1) = xˆ+ θs+
p2 − p1
2
; q2(p2) = 1− (xˆ+ θs) +
p1 − p2
2
.
Since they are smooth functions, no firm will randomize its price. If s is appropriate such
that we have an interior-solution equilibrium, then the equilibrium prices and profits are:
p1 =
2
3
(1 + xˆ+ θs), π1 =
2
9
(1 + xˆ+ θs)2;
p2 =
2
3
(2− xˆ− θs), π2 =
2
9
(2− xˆ− θs)2.
Clearly, making one firm more prominent or improving its product quality will benefit this
firm but harm the other, so our results on advertising and quality choice will not emerge
either.
6 Conclusion
This paper has examined the impacts of consumer reference dependence on market com-
petition. In particular, if consumers take some real product in the market as the reference
point and exhibit loss aversion, the firm whose product is more likely to be taken as the
39This result could even hold for a broader range of quality levels. Let us see the following simple
example. Suppose the free quality feasible set is vi ∈ [v, v + 1] (so 4 ∈ [−1, 1]). Then it is clear that the
prominent firm 1 will always pick the highest quality level v1 = v + 1. Firm 2’s problem is thus to choose
xˆ between [ 1
2 , 1]. From Figure 9, we see that it will choose xr >
1
2 (i.e., v2 < v1), where xr is the upper
limit value of xˆ such that we have a mixed-strategy pricing equilibrium at r.
40Another implication of our profit results is that, in the case with a platform as we have discussed in
Section 4, for any 4 ∈ (−1, 1), the platform will display the higher-quality product more prominently
because that will lead to higher industry profit. The proof is available from the author.
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reference point will randomize its price over a high and a low one. This oﬀers a new
explanation of sales. The welfare impact is that consumer reference dependence could
harm firms and benefit consumers by intensifying price competition. We also find that a
greater prominence diﬀerence between firms can soften price competition, and so ex ante
identical firms may tend to diﬀerentiate their advertising intensities; a relative increase of
the prominent product’s quality can also soften price competition, and so the less promi-
nent firm might supply a lower-quality product even if improving quality is costless. By
comparing to the existing research in the literature, our price result indicates that the mar-
ket implications of reference dependence may be sensitive to the specification of reference
points. In particular, it is crucial whether consumers’ reference points are independent of
or influenced by firms’ actual decisions.
Some related topics deserve future studies. First, it is desirable to explore the impact of
consumer reference dependence in a dynamic competition setting if consumers purchase the
product frequently. The impact could be diﬀerent because there the historical purchase
may influence the reference point. Second, it is also interesting to investigate how a
firm supplying several (vertically) diﬀerentiated products could benefit from manipulating
the order in which consumers consider or try products (for example, by recommending
some products or by adjusting the product launch strategy), especially when consumers
are overconfident that trying some product first would not influence their subsequent
preferences.
Our work also intends to delivery the message that the order in which people consider
options deserves more attention in economics, even if there are no explicit costs involved in
moving from one option to the other.41 In traditional economics, the consideration order
has no impact on people’s choices as long as they face the same choice set eventually.
However, with some behavioral biases, it may become an important choice determinant
factor. Reference dependence is such a bias and this paper has studied its market impli-
cations. Other biases also deserve research. For example, when processing informative
signals sequentially, people with confirmatory bias tend to stick to the opinion formed in
the early stage (Rabin and Schrag (1999), for instance), and so the early signals might be
over weighted. This may motivate some market players to manipulate the order in which
other players receive signals.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We prove a more general result:
Claim 1 If the distribution of consumers satisfies F (12) =
1
2 (of which the symmetric
distribution is a special case), then the price competition has no pure-strategy Nash equi-
librium.
41See Rubinstein and Salant (2006) and Salant (2007) for some research about choice from a list (i.e.,
an ordered choice set) in the decision theory context.
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Define
q0i(p1, p2) =
∂qi(p1, p2)
∂pi
; π0i(p1, p2) =
∂πi(p1, p2)
∂pi
.
If p1 = p2 = pˆ > 0 were an equilibrium, we must have
lim
p1→pˆ+
π01(p1, pˆ) ≤ 0 ≤ lim
p1→pˆ−
π01(p1, pˆ)
where
π01(p1, pˆ) = q1(p1, pˆ) + p1q
0
1(p1, pˆ).
However, we have
lim
p1→pˆ−
q01(p1, pˆ) = −
λ
2
f(
1
2
) < lim
p1→pˆ+
q01(p1, pˆ) = −
1
2λ
f(
1
2
)
which leads to
lim
p1→pˆ−
π01(p1, pˆ) < lim
p1→pˆ+
π01(p1, pˆ).
This is a contradiction, so p1 = p2 = pˆ cannot be an equilibrium.
Now suppose p1 > p2 > 0 were an equilibrium. First of all, it is impossible that q2 = 1,
since firm 1 would then choose p2 − ε to earn a positive profit. Since each firm’s demand
function is smooth around its own equilibrium price in such an asymmetric equilibrium,
we must have
q1 + p1q01(p1, p2) = q2 + p2q
0
2(p1, p2) = 0.
However, it is always true that q01(p1, p2) = q02(p1, p2) for p1 6= p2. Therefore, we have
q1(p1, p2)
q2(p1, p2)
=
p1
p2
.
On the other hand, when p1 > p2, q1(p1, p2) < 12 < q2(p1, p2) since F (
1
2) =
1
2 . This again
leads to a contradiction, so p1 > p2 can neither be an equilibrium. Using the same logic,
we can also exclude the possibility of p1 < p2.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We show a more general result:
Claim 2 In the single-reference-product case, given Assumption 1 and F (12) =
1
2 , there
exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which firm 1 randomizes over pL1 and p
H
1 and firm
2 charges a constant price p2.
Define
zL =
1
2
+
λ
2
(p2 − pL1 ); zH =
1
2
+
1
2λ
(p2 − pH1 ). (18)
They are the locations of consumers who are indiﬀerent between the two products when
firm 1 charges pL1 and p
H
1 , respectively. Then the demand functions are
q1(pi1, p2) = F (zi), i = L,H; q
e
2 = μ [1− F (zL)] + (1− μ) [1− F (zH)] .
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Let Fi = F (zi) and fi = f(zi). Then, in the interior-solution case, condition (i) requires
μ (1− FL) + (1− μ) (1− FH) =
p2
2
µ
μλfL +
1− μ
λ
fH
¶
. (19)
Condition (ii) requires
FL =
λ
2
pL1 fL ⇔
FL
fL
+ zL =
λ
2
p2 +
1
2
, (20)
FH =
1
2λ
pH1 fH ⇔
FH
fH
+ zH =
1
2λ
p2 +
1
2
, (21)
where we have used pL1 = p2 + (1 − 2zL)/λ and pH1 = p2 + λ(1 − 2zH) from (18). The
indiﬀerence condition (iii) is
pL1FL = p
H
1 FH . (22)
(19)—(22) define an equilibrium if (a) they have a solution (μ, p2, zL, zH) with μ ∈ (0, 1)
and 1 ≥ zL > 12 > zH ≥ 0, and (b) no firm has global profitable deviation given its rival’s
strategy.
We now show that (a) and (b) are indeed satisfied given F (12) =
1
2 and Assumption 1.
Since our proof may involve asymmetric distributions, we modify firm 2’s demand function
first:
q2(p2 < p1) = 1− F
µ
1
2
+
1
2λ
(p2 − p1)
¶
, q2(p2 > p1) = 1− F
µ
1
2
+
λ
2
(p2 − p1)
¶
.
One complication is, when firm 1 charges pL1 , it may occupy the whole market (i.e.,
the corner-solution case). Thus, we need to deal with several cases separately. Define
k1 = F (12)/f(
1
2) and k2 = F (1)/f(1). For logconave F , k1 < k2.
(1) If λ2 < (k2 + 12)/k1, we have the mixed-strategy equilibrium with an
interior solution. First, since p2 will never be negative, zH ≥ 0 is no problem according
to (21). We then prove 1 > zL > 12 > zH , which is true if
2
λ
k1 < p2 < 2λk1.
Note that zL < 1 requires p2 < 2λ(k2 +
1
2), which will be implied by p2 < 2λk1 given the
condition λ2 ≤ (k2+ 12)/k1. Now we show that, given (20)—(21), (22) does have a solution
p2 ∈ ( 2λk1, 2λk1). If p2 =
2
λk1, then (20) and (21) require zL =
1
2 (i.e., p
L
1 = p2) and
0 < zH < 12 , so
π1(pH1 , p2) = argmaxp≥p2
pq1(p, p2) > p2q1(p2, p2) = π1(pL1 , p2).
Similarly, if p2 = 2λk1, then zH = 12 (i.e., p
H
1 = p2) and 1 > zL >
1
2 , so
π1(pL1 , p2) = argmaxp≤p2
pq1(p, p2) > p2q1(p2, p2) = π1(pH1 , p2).
Then the continuity of the profit function implies our result. The last step is to show that
(19) has a solution μ ∈ (0, 1). According to (31) in the proof of Proposition 4 below, it is
actually true given zL > 12 > zH and F (
1
2) =
1
2 .
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We then discuss condition (b). Under Assumption 1, F (zi) is logconcave in pi1, so
for firm 1, the necessary conditions in (20) and (21) are also suﬃcient for optimization.
For firm 2, there is no profitable deviation on [pL1 , p
H
1 ] since Assumption 1 guarantees
that its profit function on this interval is quasi-concave. But does it have any profitable
deviation to p2 < pL1 or p2 > p
H
1 ? Under Assumption 1, its profit function is also quasi-
concave in either case. (Note that this does not mean that firm 2’s whole profit function
is quasi-concave.) Thus, a suﬃcient condition for neither case to be a profitable deviation
is that
∂πe2
∂p2
¯¯¯¯
p2→(pL1 )
−
> 0 and
∂πe2
∂p2
¯¯¯¯
p2→(pH1 )
+
< 0,
where πe2 = pq
e
2(p). They are actually true because Assumption 1 and p2 ∈ (pL1 , pH1 ) imply
∂πe2
∂p2
¯¯¯¯
p2→(pL1 )
+
≥ 0 and ∂π
e
2
∂p2
¯¯¯¯
p2→(pH1 )
−
≤ 0,
and the two kinks of qe2 are both outward.
(2) We also have the mixed-strategy equilibrium with an interior solution
when (k2 + 12)/k1 < λ
2 < k2f(z¯)/F (z¯)2 if f(1) ≤ 2, where z¯ ≤ 12 is the solution to
k2
k2 + 1/2
=
F (z¯)2
F (z¯) + (z¯ − 1/2)f(z¯) . (23)
One can verify that the solution z¯ ≤ 12 exists and (k2 +
1
2)/k1 ≤ k2f(z¯)/F (z¯)2 if and
only if f(1) ≤ 2.42 The same proof as in the above still applies except that now we
need to show p2 ∈ ( 2λk1,
2
λ(k2 +
1
2)). When p2 =
2
λk1, the same proof as before implies
π1(pL1 , p2) < π1(p
H
1 , p2). When p2 =
2
λ(k2+
1
2), (20) implies zL = 1, so p
L
1 = p2− 1λ =
2
λk2
and we get π1(pL1 , p2) =
2
λk2. Meanwhile, (22) implies π1(p
H
1 , p2) = 2λ
F 2H
fH
, where zH now
satisfies
FH
fH
+ zH −
1
2
=
1
λ2
(k2 +
1
2
). (24)
Then π1(pL1 , p2) > π1(p
H
1 , p2) if k2 > λ
2F 2H
fH
which is further equivalent to
k2
k2 + 1/2
>
F 2H
FH + (zH − 1/2)fH
by using (24). This is true if zH > z¯, which is implied by λ2 < k2f(z¯)/F (z¯)2 by appealing
to (24) again.
(3) We have the mixed-strategy equilibrium with a corner solution if λ2 ≥
(k2 + 12)/k1 (given f(1) > 2) or if λ
2 ≥ k2f(z¯)/F (z¯)2 (given f(1) ≤ 2). Under As-
sumption 1, we have the mixed-strategy equilibrium with a corner solution if the following
conditions are satisfied:
(i) pH1 = argmaxp≥p2 p · q1(p > p2);
(ii) pL1 is determined by zL = 1, i.e., p
L
1 = p2 − 1λ ;
42Let z0 satisfy F (z0) + (z0 − 12 )f(z0) = 0. Then the right-hand side of (23) is a decreasing and positive
function on (z0, 12 ) (which varies from∞ to
1
2
) and a decreasing and negative function on (0, z0). Therefore,
z¯ ∈ (z0, 12 ] when k2 ≥
1
2
(i.e., f(1) ≤ 2).
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(iii) pL1 is the best response to p2:
∂pq1(p<p2)
∂p ≤ 0 at p = pL1 ;
(iv) The indiﬀerence condition: pL1 = π1(p
H
1 , p2);
(v) p2 is the best response to (pL1 , p
H
1 , μ):
p2
2
∙
μλf(1) +
1− μ
λ
f(zH)
¸
= qe2 = (1− μ)(1− FH). (25)
We need to show that the above conditions have a solution with pL1 > 0, p2 ≤ pH1 and
μ ∈ (0, 1).
First, under Assumption 1, (i) is again equivalent to (21), so we need zH ≤ 12 (i.e.,
p2 ≤ 2λk1) for p2 ≤ pH1 . Second, (iii) requires 1 − λf(1)pL1 /2 ≤ 0. Using condition (ii),
this requires p2 ≥ 2λ(k2+
1
2) (which also implies p
L
1 > 0). Therefore, we need p2 ∈ [ 2λ(k2+
1
2), 2λk1]. (Note that this interval is not empty given our conditions.) When p2 tends to
2λk1, zH = 12 (i.e., p
H
1 = p2) and condition (iii) is satisfied, so p
L
1 = maxp≤p2 pq1(p < p2) >
p2q1(p2, p2) = π1(pH1 , p2). When p2 tends to
2
λ(k2 +
1
2), we want to have p
L
1 < π1(p
H
1 , q2),
i.e., k2 < λ2F 2H/fH , where zH is again determined by (24). Reversing the proof in case
(2) can prove this inequality.
Finally, we prove that condition (v) has a solution μ ∈ (0, 1). When μ = 1, the left-
hand side of (25) is positive but the right-hand side is zero. When μ = 0, the left-hand
side is p22λfH and the right-hand side is 1− FH . Since p2 < 2λk1, the former is smaller if
k1 < (1− FH) /fH . This is of course true given zH < 12 and F (
1
2) =
1
2 .
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We prove Proposition 3 in the following two claims:
Claim 3 In the single-reference-product case, given Assumption 1, for fixed λ > 1, there
is ε1 > 0 such that, when
¯¯
F (12)−
1
2
¯¯
< ε1, there exists a similar mixed-strategy equilibrium
as that defined in Proposition 2.
As we have seen, F (12) =
1
2 is only used in proving μ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, we only need to
revisit that step. (i) The interior-solution case. For μ ∈ (0, 1), we need gH = −gL > 0 in
(31). Let zˆ satisfy
1− 2F (zˆ)− f(zˆ)(zˆ − 1
2
) = 0.
Then we are done if zL > zˆ > zH , since
1−2F (x)
f(x) is a decreasing function given logconcave
f . For fixed λ > 1, the solution (p2, zL, zH) from (20)—(22) must satisfy zL > 12 > zH .
Thus, what we need is that zˆ is close to 12 , which is true if F (
1
2) and
1
2 are close to each
other enough. (ii) The corner-solution case. For fixed λ > 1, we have zH < 12 and so
(1− FH) /fH >
¡
1− F (12)
¢
/f(12). The latter tends to k1 if F (
1
2) is close to
1
2 .
Claim 4 In the single-reference-product case, given Assumption 1, (i) for fixed λ > 1,
there exists ε2 > 0 such that, when
¯¯
F (12)−
1
2
¯¯
< ε2, there is no pure-strategy equilibria.
(ii) For fixed
¯¯
F (12)−
1
2
¯¯
> 0, there exists λ∗ > 1 such that, when λ < λ∗, there is a
pure-strategy equilibrium with p1 > p2 if F (12) >
1
2 and p1 < p2 if F (
1
2) <
1
2 .
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(i) We only deal with the case with F (12) >
1
2 . (The other one is similar.) First of all,
it is ready to check that p1 ≤ p2 cannot even satisfy the first-order conditions given the
demand functions for p1 < p2. If p1 > p2, the demand functions are
q1 = F
µ
1
2
+
1
2λ
(p2 − p1)
¶
, q2 = 1− F
µ
1
2
+
1
2λ
(p2 − p1)
¶
.
If there exists an equilibrium with p1 > p2, then the necessary conditions are qi+pi ∂qi∂pi = 0,
which imply
F (z)
1− F (z) =
p1
p2
,
F (z)
f(z)
=
p1
2λ
,
where z = 12 +
1
2λ(p2 − p1). Using p2 = p1 − λ(1− 2z), we get
F (z)
1− F (z) =
1
1− (1− 2z)f(z)/2F (z) . (26)
The necessary conditions define a pure-strategy equilibrium with p1 > p2 if (a) the equation
(26) has a solution z < 12 and (b) given pi, firm j has no global deviation. In the following,
we will show that condition (a) is always true given F (12) >
1
2 , while condition (b) will fail
if F (12) is too close to
1
2 .
Logconcave F implies that f(z)F (z) decreases with z. Then the right-hand side of (26)
has the following shape: there exists z0 ∈ (0, 12) satisfying 1− (1− 2z0)f(z0)/2F (z0) = 0,
such that it decreases from 0 to −∞ when z ∈ (0, z0), and it decreases from +∞ to 1
when z ∈ (z0, 12). Meanwhile, the left-hand side of (26) is an increasing function of z, and
when F (12) >
1
2 , we have
F (1/2)
1−F (1/2) > 1. Thus, (26) must have a solution z ∈ (z0,
1
2). If
F (12) → (
1
2)
+, then the solution z to (26) tends to 12 and so p1 → p2. For fixed λ > 1,
then firm 1 must have a profitable deviation due to its inward demand kink.
(ii) When will (b) be satisfied? We only need to worry about firm 1’s possible deviation.
For fixed F (12)−
1
2 > 0, z <
1
2 is fixed, and so p1 − p2 = λ(1− 2z) is bounded away from
zero. If λ → 1, then firm 1’s demand curve tends to be smooth everywhere and so the
necessary conditions should also be suﬃcient under Assumption 1.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
We first need to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Suppose f(x) is symmetric and logconcave on [0, 1].
(i) The function
φ(x) =
1/2− F (x)
(1/2− x)f(x)
is symmetric on [0, 1]. For the uniform distribution, φ(x) = 1. Beyond this special case,
φ(x) strictly decreases on [0, 12) and strictly increases on (
1
2 , 1].
(ii) The function
A(x) =
F (x)2
F (x) + (x− 1/2)f(x)
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decreases on (z0, 12) and increases on (
1
2 , 1], where z0 satisfies F (z0)+(z0−1/2)f(z0) = 0.
For any ε ∈ (0, 12 − z0), A(
1
2 − ε) > A(
1
2 + ε).
(iii) The function
B(x) = F (x)2 [2φ(x) + 1]
increases on [0, 1].
Proof. (i) The symmetry is easy to see since f(x) is symmetric. Now we prove φ(x) is
strictly decreasing on [0, 12 ] for non-uniform distributions. Since f(x) is logconcave and
symmetric, it must increase on [0, 12 ], and so F (x) is convex on [0,
1
2 ]. One can check that,
when x < 12 , φ
0(x) has the sign of
(F − 1
2
)
µ
1
x− 1/2 +
f 0
f
¶
− f
which is negative if
(
1
2
− F )f
0
f
+ f >
1/2− F
1/2− x .
The right-hand side is increasing since F is convex on [0, 1/2]. When x < 12 , the derivative
of the left-hand side has the sign of ff 00−f 02 which must be negative since f is logconcave,
and so the left-hand side is decreasing. Moreover, when x → 12 , both sides tend to f(
1
2).
Therefore, the above inequality must hold for x < 12 .
(ii) A(x) is positive on (z0, 1]. One can verify that A0(x) has the sign of (x− 12)(2f2−
Ff 0). Since the second term must be positive given logconcave F , A(x) decreases on (z0, 12 ]
and increases on [12 , 1]. Second, notice
A(
1
2
− ε) = (1/2− σ)
2
1/2− σ − εf , A(
1
2
+ ε) =
(1/2 + σ)2
1/2 + σ + εf
,
where σ = 12 − F (
1
2 − ε) = F (
1
2 + ε) −
1
2 > 0 and f = f(
1
2 − ε) = f(
1
2 + ε). Then
A(12 − ε) > A(
1
2 + ε) if and only if
2(
1
4σ
+ σ)(1 +
εf
σ
) > 1.
Since 14σ + σ ≥ 1, this inequality must be true.
(iii) When x > 12 , we have known that φ(x) is increasing in x, so B(x) is increasing
as well. When x < 12 , φ(x) > 1 since φ(
1
2) = 1. One can check that B
0(x) > 0 if
(2φ+ 1)f/F > −φ0. Notice that, for x < 12 ,
−φ0 = φ− 1
x− 1/2 + φ
f 0
f
< φ
f 0
f
.
Thus, it suﬃces to show 2+ 1φ > Ff
0/f2, which however must be true since logconcave F
implies Ff 0 < f2.
We then continue to prove the main result. We first show a preliminary result:
1
2
− zH < zL −
1
2
, (27)
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where zi is defined in (18). To prove this, we rewrite the indiﬀerence condition (22) as
F 2L/fL
F 2H/fH
= λ2 (28)
by using (20) and (21). On the other hand, (20) and (21) also imply
FL/fL + (zL − 1/2)
FH/fH + (zH − 1/2)
= λ2. (29)
From (28) and (29), we have A(zL) = A(zH). (27) then follows from result (ii) in Lemma
1 given zH > z0 (which is further implied by (21) and the definition of z0).
(i) Using (20) and (21), we rewrite (19) as
μ
∙
1− 2FL − (zL −
1
2
)fL
¸
+ (1− μ)
∙
1− 2FH − (zH −
1
2
)fH
¸
= 0. (30)
Let g(x) = 1− 2F (x)− (x− 12)f(x). Then we solve
μ =
gH
gH − gL
, (31)
where gi = g(zi). Notice that, for any ε ∈ [0, 12 ], g(
1
2 − ε) = −g(
1
2 + ε) > 0. Hence, (27)
implies μ < 12 . We now prove p
e
1 > p2. It is equivalent to (1− μ)(pH1 − p2) > μ(p2 − pL1 ),
which holds if and only if
−gL
zL − 1/2
λ2 >
gH
1/2− zH
by using (31) and (18). Furthermore, using (28) and the definition of gi, we can rewrite
this inequality as B(zL) > B(zH), which is true given result (iii) in Lemma 1 and zL > zH .
(ii) qe2 = 1− μFL − (1− μ)FH ≤ 12 if and only if
(FL −
1
2
)gH ≥ −(
1
2
− FH)gL.
Using the definition of gi, this is further equivalent to φ(zH) ≤ φ(zL). For the uniform
distribution, this inequality must be binding and so qe2 =
1
2 . Beyond this special case,
result (i) in Lemma 1 and (27) imply that this inequality holds strictly.
(iii) Given p2, firm 1 can at least earn p22 by charging p2. Thus, π1 >
p2
2 ≥ π2 since
qe2 ≤ 12 .
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
(i) We first deal with the mixed-strategy equilibrium with an interior solution. If firm 1
uses the mixed strategy, then for p ∈ (pL1 , pH1 ) firm 2’s expected demand function is
qe2(p) = 1− xˆ+
μh
2
(pL1 − p) +
(1− μ)l
2
(pH1 − p). (32)
Similar treatment as in Section 3 leads to
pL1 =
1 + r
h
xˆ, pH1 =
r(1 + r)
h
xˆ, p2 =
2r
h
xˆ. (33)
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Now (7) becomes
2 [μh+ (1− μ)l] p2 = 2(1− xˆ) + μhpL1 + (1− μ)lpH1 .
Then
μ =
1
r2 − 1
µ
2− xˆ
3xˆ
r − 1
¶
. (34)
For μ to be between zero and one, we need
1
r
<
2− xˆ
3xˆ
< r.
Since qL1 = xˆ +
h
2 (p2 − pL1 ) =
xˆ
2 (1 + r), the condition for having an interior solution is
r < 2−xˆxˆ , which is the counterpart of (6) in this asymmetric-quality case. Finally, these
two conditions themselves require xˆ <
√
3− 1.43
We then consider the mixed-strategy equilibrium with a corner solution. It exists if the
following conditions are satisfied:
(i) pH1 = argmaxp≥p2 p · q1(p > p2);
(ii) pL1 is determined by q
L
1 = xˆ+
h
2 (p2 − pL1 ) = 1;
(iii) pL1 is the best response to p2:
∂pq1(p<p2)
∂p ≤ 0 at p = pL1 ;
(iv) The indiﬀerence condition: pL1 = p
H
1 · q1(pH1 );
(v) p2 is the best response to (pL1 , p
H
1 , μ):
p2
2
[μh+ (1− μ)l] = qe2 = (1− μ)
∙
1− xˆ+ l
2
¡
pH1 − p2
¢¸
.
We prove the existence of a solution which satisfies pL1 < p2 < p
H
1 and μ ∈ (0, 1) when
(15) holds. First of all, from (i) and (ii), we have
pL1 = p2 −
2
h
(1− xˆ), pH1 =
xˆ
l
+
p2
2
.
Then the indiﬀerence condition (iv) requires
p2 −
2
h
(1− xˆ) = 1
2l
µ
xˆ+
l
2
p2
¶2
.
One can show that this equation has a solution
p2 ∈
µ
2
h
(2− xˆ),min
½
2xˆ
l
,
2
l
2− xˆ
3
¾¶
(35)
by noting that 2−xˆxˆ and 3
q
1−xˆ
5−5xˆ−xˆ2 cross at xˆ =
√
3− 1. Explicitly,
p2 =
2
l
h
2− xˆ− 2
p
(1− xˆ)(1− 1/r2)
i
. (36)
Next, we prove that condition (v) has a solution μ ∈ (0, 1). Simple algebra shows that
condition (v) can be rewritten as
μ
1− μ =
2− xˆ
hp2
− 3
2r2
. (37)
43This is because 1r <
2−xˆ
3xˆ implies r >
3xˆ
2−xˆ . Then we need
3xˆ
2−xˆ <
2−xˆ
xˆ which implies xˆ <
√
3− 1.
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To prove that the right-hand side of (37) is positive, we consider the case xˆ < 12 and xˆ >
1
2
separately. In the former case, 2xˆl <
2
l
2−xˆ
3 , so p2 <
2xˆ
l follows from (35). In the latter
case, p2 < 2l
2−xˆ
3 . Both of them imply that the right-hand side of (37) is positive. The last
step is to check (iii). At p = pL1 ,
∂pq1(p < p2)
∂p
= 1− h
2
pL1 < 0
since p2 > 2h(2− xˆ) from (35) implies pL1 >
2
h .
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(ii) We now consider the pure-strategy equilibrium. Let us consider the case with xˆ > 12
first. In this case, we have an equilibrium with p1 > p2 if (i) p1 = argmaxp≥p2 p·q1(p > p2),
(ii) p2 = argmaxp≤p1 p · q2(p < p1), and (iii) p1 · q1(p1 > p2) ≥ maxp≤p2 p · q1(p < p2).
Condition (iii) means that firm 1 does not want to deviate to a price lower than p2. (We
do not need to worry about firm 2 since its demand function is concave.) From (i) and
(ii), it is ready to solve
p1 =
2
l
1 + xˆ
3
> p2 =
2
l
2− xˆ
3
given xˆ > 12 . Then
π1 =
2
l
µ
1 + xˆ
3
¶2
; π2 =
2
l
µ
2− xˆ
3
¶2
.
Now consider firm 1’s potential deviation to p01 < p2. Let π01 be the corresponding deviation
profit. Given p2, if we do not consider any constraint, firm 1’s optimal response associated
with the demand function q1(p < p2) is
p01 =
p2
2
+
xˆ
h
.
But this price could be greater than p2 or too low such that the corresponding demand is
greater than 1. This causes complications and we need to discuss the following three cases
separately. (a) When p01 ≥ p2 (which happens when r ≤
q
3xˆ
2−xˆ), the optimal deviation
price should be p2, so the deviation must be unprofitable. (b) When p01 is too low such
that the demand is greater than 1 (which happens when r ≥
√
3), the optimal deviation
price should be
p2 −
2
h
(1− xˆ),
which just makes firm 1 win the whole market. Then
π01 = p2 −
2
h
(1− xˆ) = 2
µ
2− xˆ
3l
− 1− xˆ
h
¶
,
44Now we discuss the properties of this equilibrium. First, one can show that p2 in (36) goes up with xˆ
under (15). This is because ∂p2∂xˆ > 0 if and only if r
2 > 1xˆ . If xˆ >
1
3
, it is no problem because r >
√
3 from
(15) (see also Figure 7). If xˆ < 1
3
, (15) implies r2 > ( 2−xˆxˆ )
2 > 1xˆ . Then it is clear that firm 1’s prices also
increase with xˆ. Second, firm 1’s profit is just equal to pL1 and so increases with xˆ, and firm 2’s profit is
π2 =
1− μ
2
∙
(2− xˆ)p2 −
l
2
p22
¸
=
hp22
2
∙
1− r
2 − 1
(2− xˆ)/lp2 + r2 − 3/2
¸
,
where the second equality follows from (37). A lengthy proof shows π2 also rises with xˆ.
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which is lower than π1 if and only if r2(5−5xˆ− xˆ2) < 9(1− xˆ). (c) When p01 is appropriate
(i.e., when
q
3xˆ
2−xˆ < r <
√
3), the deviation profit is
π01 =
1
2h
(xˆ+
h
2
p2)2 =
2
h
∙
r2
3
+ (
1
2
− r
2
6
)xˆ
¸2
.
One can check that π01 < π1 if and only if r <
3xˆ
2−xˆ . The conditions derived in (a)—(c) can
be rewritten as (16) with the help of Figure 7.
The case with xˆ < 12 can be similarly treated. The candidate pure-strategy equilibrium
prices are
p1 =
2
h
1 + xˆ
3
< p2 =
2
h
2− xˆ
3
.
Then
π1 =
2
h
µ
1 + xˆ
3
¶2
; π2 =
2
h
µ
2− xˆ
3
¶2
.
When we consider firm 1’s potential deviation to p01 > p2, we will not encounter the
situation like the above (b), so it is much simpler to derive (17). The calculation is
straightforward and so omitted.
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